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Charter of Rights decisions (1982-1989). Charter appeals now constitute one-quarter of the Court's annual
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jurisprudence. It has upheld rights claimants in 35 percent of its decisions and declared nineteen statutes void.
Seventy-five percent of the Court's Charter work dealt with legal rights and criminal justice, but more
provincial statutes were declared invalid than federal. After an initial period of consensus, the Court divided
into identifiable voting blocs, with wide discrepancies between different Judges' support for Charter claims. In
three respects-composition of docket, success rate, and nullification of statutes- the Canadian Supreme Court
closely resembled its American counterpart.
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THE SUPREME COURT'S FIRST ONE
HUNDRED CHARTER OF RIGHTS
DECISIONS: A STATISTICAL
. ANALYSIS©
By F.L. MORTON,* PETER H. RUSSELL,** AND

MICHAEL J. WITHEY*

This study presents a descriptive statistical analysis of the Supreme Court of
Canada's first one hundred Charterof Rights decisions (1982-1989). Charter
appeals now constitute one-quarter of the Court's annual caseload. The Court
has abandoned the judicial self-restraint that shaped its pre-Chartercivil
liberties jurisprudence. It has upheld rights claimants in 35 percent of its
decisions and declared nineteen statutes void. Seventy-five percent of the
Court's Charterwork dealt with legal rights and criminal justice, but more
provincial statutes were declared invalid than federal. After an initial period
of consensus, the Court divided into identifiable voting blocs, with wide
discrepancies between different Judges' support for Charterclaims. In three
respects-composition of docket, success rate, and nullification of statutes
-- the Canadian Supreme Court closely resembled its American counterpart.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On 16 April 1982, Canada formally amended its written
Constitution by adding the Charterof Rights andFreedoms.1 The Charter
explicitly authorized judicial review and the power of all courts to
declare offending statutes void. At the time, this constitutional
transplant of American-style judicial review into the Canadian hybrid of
British-style parliamentary democracy posed important questions of
both theoretical and practical interest. Canada had already modified the
Westminster model of parliamentary supremacy with an overlay of
federalism and judicial review. However, the "exhaustion theory" held
that both levels of government were supreme within their respective
jurisdictions. The Charter appeared to challenge this supremacy and
perhaps the structure of federalism itself. Suffice it to say that, in the
intervening eight years, the Charter, or more precisely, the Charter
through the courts, has had a broad, varied, and significant impact on
the practice of politics in Canada. 2 In November 1989, the Supreme
1

rCanadian CharterofRights andFreedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule

B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
2 For article length discussions, see P.H. Russell, "Canada's Charter. A Political Report"

(1984) Pub. Law 385 and F.L. Morton, "The Political Impact of the Canadian Charterof Rights and
Freedoms" (1987) Can. J. Pol. Sci. 31. For book length'treatments, see P. Monahan, Politicsand the
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Court of Canada handed down its one hundredth Charter decision. 3
This paper presents a statistical overview of these first one hundred
Charter cases. It identifies trends with respect to both the Charter's
impact on the Court and the impact of the Court's decisions on the
Charter.
Statistical analyses of the Supreme Court's Charterdecisions can
provide an overall picture of the main patterns of a court's work and, in
this way, provide a broader context for interpreting the significance of an
individual case or the performance of an individual judge. Quantitative
analyses can also increase our understanding of institutional features of
a court's work, such as the distribution and sources of its case load and
the relationships among its members. In sum, by identifying patterns not
discernible through the study of leading Charter cases, quantitative
analysis can generate empirically supported generalizations-that is, new
understandings-of how the Charteris affecting the Supreme Court and
how the Court is shaping the Charter.
This is not to deny the limitations of quantitative analysis of
judicial decision making. It is not a substitute for jurisprudential
analysis. For supreme courts-indeed, for all appellate courts in
common law countries-the reasons given to justify a decision are often
more important in the long run than a decision's basic outcome or
"bottom line." In this respect, judicial decision making differs
significantly from executive or legislative decision making. A single
decision on a right or freedom can-because of the far reaching
implications of its supporting reasons-outweigh in importance dozens
of other decisions on the same right or freedom which go in the opposite
direction. Statistical analyses treat all cases equally, when in fact they
are clearly not all of equal significance. Similarly, statistical
classifications of cases in terms of their bottom line outcomes-for
example, upholding or denying a Charter claim-do not capture
Constitution: The Charter,Federalismand The Supreme Court of Canada(Toronto: Carswell, 1987);
M. Mandel, The Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989); D.M.
Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian Production of ConstitutionalReview
(Toronto: Carswell, 1990); and R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, CharterPolitics (Scarborough, Ont.:
Nelson Canada, 1992).
3 It is not obvious what is and what is not a "Charterdecision." Different rules for counting
produce different results. For example, a recent study using different rules counted 121 Charter
cases during approximately the same period as our study. See A. Heard, "The Charter in the
Supreme Court of Canada: The Importance of Which Judges Hear an Appeal" (1991) 24 Can. J.
Pol. Sci. 289. Our counting rules and the reasons behind them are set out in Appendix I, below at
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important jurisprudential subtleties. A decision that upholds a Charter
claim might do so through opinions that actually narrow the meaning of
the Charterright involved.
These limitations qualify, but do not negate, the value of a statistical approach to the Supreme Court's first one hundred Charter
decisions. Statistical studies make a necessary contribution to the larger
and more complex task of assessing the Supreme Court's Charter
jurisprudence. Descriptive statistics provide a solid foundation,
grounded in real facts, from which other studies can build, qualify, and
elaborate. They also provide a healthy empirical check on what might
otherwise be impressionistic generalizations about both the Charterand
the Court. We present the following study in the spirit that animated
Pritchett's landmark study of the American "Roosevelt Court":
What is obviously needed is a method in which the analysis is kept from shooting off into
the void by being moored to a statistical and factual base, and in which fact-gathering is
4
kept from becoming meaningless by being related to significant analysis.

II. THE CHARTER'S IMPACT ON THE COURT'S CASE LOAD
The Charter has changed the composition of the Supreme
Court's case load. Table 1 shows that, since the Court's first Charter
decision in May 1984, the volume of Chartercases has steadily increased.
Since 1987, it has constituted nearly one-quarter of the Court's annual
output of decided cases. Significantly, the corresponding percentage for
the United States Supreme Court is almost identical. During the same
time period, the American Court decided 169 Bill of Rights5 decisions
out of a total of 732 written decisions, or 23 percent. 6 This institutional
parallel was unthinkable prior to the Charter.

4 C.H. Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in JudicialPoliticsand Values, 1937-1947 (New

York: Octagon Books, 1963) at xv.
5 U.S. CoNsr. amends. I-X [hereinafterBill of Rights].

6 Figures provided by H. Spaeth, Director, Supreme Court Data Base Project, Michigan State
University.
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TABLE 1

CharterDecisions by All Supreme Court Decisions, 1981-1989

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Total

All
Decisions

Charter
Decisions

Percent
of Total

111
117
87
63
83
81
95
104
126

0
0
0
4
11
11
23
25
29a

0%
0%
0%
6%
13%
14%
24%
24%
23%

104 a

12%

8 67 b

a. Only Table 1 uses Charterdecisions through the end of 1989 - 104 cases. The other
tables are based on the first 100 decisions.
b. Data provided by Sylvie Roussel of Noel, D~cary, Aubry Associates, Supreme Court
News (Hull, Quebec).

This surge of Charter litigation contrasts sharply with the
development of the 1960 CanadianBill of Rights.7 From 1960 to 1982,
the Supreme Court decided only thirty-four Canadian Bill of Rights
cases, an average of slightly over one per year. The high success of
Charterclaims in the Court's first two years of decision making, as shown
in Table 2, seems to have stimulated use of the Charter. The Supreme
Court sent a message to the legal profession and lower court judges that
it was much more receptive towards rights claimants and an activist
exercise of judicial review than it was under the 1960 CanadianBill of
Rights. Under the latter, the Supreme Court did not hand down a ruling
that supported a rights claim until its 1969 Drybones decision,8 and even
this turned out to be the exception not the rule.
7 R.S.C. 1985, App. III.
8 R. v. Drybones, [1970] S.C.R. 282 [hereinafterDrybones].
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Supreme Court of Canada: Charter Decisions by All Decisions by Year
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The total of 63 cases decided in 1984 represented the Court's
lowest annual output since it took over as Canada's highest court in
1949. It was not until 1988 that the Court returned to the one hundred
plus level which has been its norm since 1949. There has been
disagreement over the cause of this decline. Russell has attributed it in
part to the added complexity and burden of the Charter cases?
Monahan has disputed this explanation and has suggested that the
Supreme Court's low productivity reflected changes in "the preferences
and attitudes" of the Justices.10 Both agreed that the poor health of
several Justices-notably Chief Justice Laskin and Justice
9 See P.H. Russell, "The First Three Years in Charterland" (1985) 28 Can. Pub. Ad. 367 at
10

Monahan, supra, note 2 at 26.
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Chouinard-in the early 1980s contributed to the Court's loss of
productivity.

More recent events lend credence to Russell's thesis of
"information overload." In a 1987 interview, Justice Lamer declared
that Chartercases were "especially gruelling" because of the difficulty of
anticipating their longer term consequences. Lamer reiterated this view
upon becoming the new Chief Justice in June 1990.11 Upon his
retirement in 1988, Justice Estey took issue with Lamer's assessment, but
his other comments confirmed that he had become impatient with his
colleagues' agonizing over Charter decisions.12 Justice Le Dain's early
retirement in 1987 was explained as a result of mental strain. During
this same time period, the number of Court personnel doubled to 134
persons, 13 it abolished oral hearings for requests for leave to appeal, and
twice lowered the maximum time allowed for oral argument on the
merits-now only one hour per side. All these changes suggest an
institution struggling to cope with its new workload.
The advent of the Charter has not meant an abatement of
constitutional cases involving federalism. Indeed, the Supreme Court
and lower courts still prefer, where possible, to settle a constitutional
case on federalism grounds rather than the Charter.14 During the period
of the Court's first one hundred Chartercases, it also decided thirty-one
federalism cases. This means that the Court's constitutional mandate is
which has
actually wider than that of the United States Supreme Court, 15
federalism.
of
umpire
an
as
virtually abandoned any active role
With Charterlitigation added to constitutional litigation based on
the division of powers, the Supreme Court has become much more
11 K. Makin, "Lamer Picked to Head Supreme Court" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (27 June
1990) Al.
12
K. Makin, "Plain-talking Estey" The [Toronto] Globe andMail (27 April 1988) Al.
13 D. Vienneau, "Familiar Faces leave Supreme Court of Canada" (1990) 17:1 The National
14.
14 For example, in Westendorp v. R., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43, the Supreme Court side-stepped a
section 2(b) freedom of speech challenge to Calgary's anti-soliciting (prostitution) by-law by striking
down the by-law as an invasion of the federal government's exclusive section 91 jurisdiction over
criminal law.
15 See Garcia v. San Antonio, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) discussed in R. Knopff & F.L. Morton,
"Policing the Boundaries of Federalism: Judicial Review in a Comparative Perspective" (Paper
presented at Adaptive Federalism: The United States and Canada Compared Conference, Nelson
A. Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College, 22-25 June 1989) [unpublished].
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concerned with constitutional issues than was the case in the past. It
would be a mistake, however, to regard the Canadian Supreme Court as
simply a "constitutional court." Constitutional cases continue to account
for only one-quarter to one-third of its decisions. This figure is only
slightly lower than the comparable figure for the American Supreme
6
Court for the same time period-44 percent.1
On the other hand, the Charterhas contributed to the further
decline of private law and a corresponding increase in public law cases.
As Monahan correctly pointed out, the decline in private law cases
decided by the Court dates back to 1974, when appeals as of right in
private law cases were abolished. Prior to 1974, private law cases
constituted approximately one-half of the cases decided by the Supreme
Court each year. Since 1974, private law cases have steadily declined to
the point where they now account for less than one-quarter.17
Monahan is thus correct in arguing that the decline of private
law cases cannot simply be explained by the advent of the Charter.18
However, his earlier conclusion, that both public and private law cases
were declining in absolute numbers, must be revised in light of the more
recent data. The Court's slow climb back to its old levels of productivity
that began in 1985 corresponded with a doubling and then a redoubling
of the number of Chartercases that it decided each year. Meanwhile, the
number of civil law cases decided has remained stable at about 16
percent 9 To conclude, while the Charter has not made the Supreme
Court into an exclusively "constitutional court," it has contributed to the
Court's transformation into a decidedly "public law" court.
III. OUTCOME OF CASES
In the thirty-four CanadianBill of Rights cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada between 1960 and 1982, the rights claimant
won only five times-a "success rate" of only 15 percent. Table 2 shows
how markedly different the Supreme Court has treated rights claims
16

Out of a total of 732 written decisions, 324 were Bill ofRights cases. See Spaeth, supra, note

17

Monahan, supra,note 2 at 18. These are Monahan's figures through 1985.

18

Iid.at 22.

6.

19 See "Statistics" (1989) 5 Supreme Court News 24.
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under the Charter. Thirty-five of the first one hundred Chartercases
were won by the litigant. Once again, there is a strong parallel with
American experience. During the same time frame, the nongovernment claimant won sixty-one of the 169 Bill of Rights decisions
handed down by the American Supreme Court, a "success rate" of 36
percent!
TABLE 2

Outcome of the Supreme Court's First One Hundred CharterDecisions
Charter Claimant
Losses
Wins
1984

1

3(75%)

1985

3

1986

8

1987

16

1988

17
a

Total

1989

Inconclusive

Total

0

4

7(64%)

1

11

3(27%)

0

11

6(26%)

1

23

8(32%)

0

25

16

8(31%)

2

26

61

35(35%)

4

100

a. Through November 1989.

During its first two years of Charterdecisions (1984 and 1985),
the Court awarded victories to 67 percent (ten of fifteen) of the Charter
claimants who came before it. The success rate of Charterclaimants fell
off steeply after this initial burst of judicial enthusiasm, averaging 27
percent to 32 percent over the last four years. During these six years,
there has been a turnover of six Justices, and the Mulroney government
has filled all six vacancies. Some commentators have attributed the
sharp drop in Charter success rates to the change in the Court's
personnel. David Beatty, for example, has described the six Mulroney
appointees as "conservative judges... [who] are very deferential to the
legislature [and] don't want to hold a law unconstitutional."20

20 The quotation is from G. Heaton, "Lest Ye Be Judged" (1990) 17:21 Western Report 36 at
36, which refers to Beatty, supra,note 2.
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This analysis is only superficially persuasive. When the dramatic
shift in outcomes first occurred in 1986, there had been only one change
in the Court's personnel-La Forest replacing Ritchie. The next
Mulroney appointment-L'-Ieureux-Dub6-had no discernable impact
on the Court's Charterwork until 1988, the third year of lower success
rates. Furthermore, the decline in judicial activism after 1985 was
common to all the Justices, not just the Mulroney appointees. For
example, Dickson and Lamer, two of Beatty's "Trudeau liberals," had
lower "pro-Charter"records than the Court average in 1989.21 Finally,
when we compare the record of the four Trudeau Justices who have left
the court since 1988-Estey, Beetz, Le Dain, and McIntyre-with the
four Mulroney replacements-Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, and McLachlin
-it is far from evident that the newcomers represent a distinctly more
conservative approach to Charterissues. Indeed, McIntyre, a Trudeau
appointee, emerged as the Court's most outspoken and consistent
proponent of judicial self-restraint. Moreover, McIntyre's Charter
performance is consistent with his voting record in federalism cases,
which also discloses a commitment to judicial self-restraint and deference to elected lawmakers 2 2 In sum, there is no consistent empirical
support for Beatty's thesis that Prime Minister Mulroney has used his
appointment power to shape an ideologically "conservative" or selfrestrained Supreme Court.
A more probable explanation for the drop in the success rate of
Charterclaims after 1985 is a philosophical shift among some of the
same Justices who began the Court's Charterinterpretation in 1984. In
retrospect, these first two years can be seen as a sort of Charter
"honeymoon." Not only were many of these first fifteen decisions
strongly activist, all but two were unanimous. The written judgments in
these decisions manifested a very sanguine-some might say, naively
optimistic-view of the Court's new role under the Charter. The Court
seemed intent on minimizing any tension between its new mode of
American-style judicial activism and its traditional, constitutional
functions. The Judges seemed to be trying to convince their public-and
21 See below, Table 13 at 40.
22 See G. Stevenson, "Federalism, Judicial Activism, and the Supreme Court of Canada since

1973" (Paper presented at Adaptive Federalism: The United States and Canada Compared
Conference, Nelson A. Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences, Dartmouth College, 22-25 June
1989) [unpublished].
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perhaps themselves-that they were simply carrying out the legal
implications of the Charter. The Court wanted to have its cake and eat it
too, and for a brief moment, it did. Like all honeymoons, this one came
to an end. As the Court ventured deeper into "Charterland," it was no
coincidence that the success rate for Chartercases began to fall precipitously, while at the same time, the number of dissenting opinions soared.
The number of unanimously decided Charter decisions dropped from
23 The
over 85 percent in 1984-85 to the 60 percent range since then.
falling success rate and growing division on the Court both reflect the
same hard reality: the inescapably contentious character of modern
judicial review.
Success Rate and Unanimous Decisions in Charter Cases
(Tables 2 and 1I)
100
r-r

% Unanimous
% Claimant Wins

80

2 60.

40

20 -

1984

1985

1987

1986
Year
Figure 2

23 See below, Table 11 at 37.

1988

1989
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The seeds of this change were already present in the Court's
1984 and 1985 Charter decisions. Monahan noted that these early
Charter decisions were characterized by two very different and
conflicting tendencies. 24 On the one hand, the Court repeatedly invoked
the rhetoric of judicial activism (especially Lord Sankey's "living tree"
metaphor) and repeatedly ruled in favour of Charterclaimants. At the
same time, the Court drew a sharp distinction between law and politics,
characterizing its new role under the Charteras purely legal. 25 Monahan
argued that this somewhat schizophrenic behaviour was symptomatic of
an underlying crisis in the Court over its new role under the Charter and
"the relationship between law and politics." 26
Gold noted that, under the veneer of unanimity in the Court's
early Charterdecisions, there were already doctrinal differences foreshadowing the later division of the Court. Gold suggested that these
disagreements were more often expressed as concurring opinions rather
than dissents because of "the Court's desire to establish the legitimacy of
judicial review under the Charter and to satisfy its audiences that the
Charterwould not be interpreted as narrowly as had the CanadianBill of
Rights."'27 This tension was also evident in the Court's use-or
misuse-of the "living tree doctrine" to justify its new Charteractivism.
As Gold observed, the Court's initial interpretations of the Charterwere
"as broad and liberal as could possibly be expected," an approach that it
sought to justify by repeatedly
invoking the metaphor of the constitution as a living tree and dismissing concerns about
the legitimacy of its expanded role ... No one could mistake the Court's message ... the
Charterwas to be liberally interpreted and enthusiastically applied.2 8

24

Monahan, supra, note 2 at c. 4.

25 The most memorable example of this early attitude was Justice Wilson's curt assertion in
OperationDismantle Inc. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 472 that "[t]he question before us is not

whether the government's defense policy is sound but whether or not it violates the appellants'

rights under section 7 of the Charter. This is a totally different question." Monahan caustically
debunks this type of legalism, supra, note 2 at 62.
26
Monahan, supra, note 2 at 56.
27

M. Gold, "Of Rights and Roles: The Supreme Court and the Charter" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L.

Rev. 507 at 530.
28 M. Gold, "The Rhetoric of Rights: The Supreme Court and the Charter" (1987) 25
Osgoode Hall LJ. 375 at 410.
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While the living tree doctrine originated in Lord Sankey's now famous
dicta in the Persons case,29 it developed primarily in the law of Canadian
federalism. In this context, it came to be widely used, primarily by
English Canadian jurists favouring a more centralist constitutional
order,30 to encourage judges to accommodate new policy initiatives of
Canadian governments through a "flexible" interpretation of the federal
division of powers effected by the ConstitutionAct, 186731 Its practical
effect was a form of judicial self-restraint that defers to majoritarian or
democratic influences in Canadian government. By contrast, when the
focus of the living tree doctrine is shifted from the law of federalism to
the law of civil liberties, the roles of courts and legislatures are reversed.
Rather than expanding legislative powers, the living tree doctrine
expands limitations on legislative power. Rather than accommodating
legislative problem solving, judges are encouraged to use the Charterto
correct legislative errors. The continued use of the same legal metaphor
of the living tree obscures the radical revaluation that has occurred.
While the original version of the living tree entails judicial self-restraint,
the new version promotes judicial activism
While Monahan's characterization of the problem as a crisis may
be overstated, there was clearly a tension between the Court's legalistic
pretence and its activist behaviour. In 1986, this tension came to a head
for at least some of the Justices, who adopted a more cautious or selfrestrained approach to their Charterwork.33 This shift was particularly
evident in the three cases decided early in 1986 rejecting language rights
claims 34 and in the cases rejecting claims of organized labour decided
later in 1986 and early 1987.35
29

Edwardsv.A.G. Canada,[1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.) at 136.

30 See A. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and its Critics" (1971) 4 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 301 at 345.

31 ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K-), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North AmericaAct, 1867).
32 This is a summary of an argument developed in F.L. Morton & R. Knopff, "Permanence
and Change in a Written Constitution: A Critical Analysis of the 'Living Tree' Doctrine and the
Charterof Rights" (1990) 1 Sup. Ct L. Rev. (2d) 533 at 546.
33 See Russell, supra, note 2.
34 Bilodeau v. A.G. Canada, [1986] 1 S.C.R 449; MacDonald v. Montreal (City of), [1986] 1
S.C.R. 460; and Soci&6 desAcadiens v. Association of Parents, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549.
35

1R.W.D.S.U. v. DolphinDelivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [hereinafter DolphinDelivey];Reference
Re Public Service Employees RelationsAct, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313; P.S.C. v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424;
and Saskatchewan v. R. W.D.S.U., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
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The growing sense of caution and judicial self-restraint can also
be seen in the Court's handling of section 1 "reasonable limits" claims by
the Crown. Section 1 involves what is widely recognized as a highly
discretionary balancing test between the policy interests of the
government and the interest of the claimant in having Charter rights
upheld. From 1984 through 1987, the Court rejected all but one of the
eleven section 1 defenses presented by the Crown. By contrast, in 1988
and 1989, it accepted eight of fourteen. 36 This data confirms what was
already an open secret: the Court has become badly divided on how to
handle the section I issue.
The simultaneous drop in the success rate and increase in
dissenting opinions after 1985 cannot be explained as an effect of
"conservative" Mulroney appointments to the Court. Rather, it represents a Working out of the tension between the activist behaviour and the
legalistic pretence in the Court's earlier decisions. There are real
tensions between judicial review of constitutional rights and parliamentary democracy, and it was inevitable that these would surface and
produce disagreement among the Justices. The same disagreements
have fuelled constitutional debate in the United States for the past
twenty years, and the advent of the Charter has brought "an American
debate ...
to Canada. ' 37 It has not, at least not yet, brought the corollary

American practice of "court packing" into Canadian politics. The most
that can be said at this point about the Mulroney Supreme Court
appointments is that they have been chosen according to traditional, nonideological criteria, and they have neither impeded nor hastened any
prior trends in the Court's approach to Charterinterpretation.
Even at the current lower levels of success, the Charter has
served as a catalyst for a new era of judicial activism unparalleled in
Canadian history and on a par with contemporary American practice.
Evaluations of the Supreme Court's overall Charterperformance tend to
vary according to one's constitutional and judicial philosophy, as well as
to one's approval or disapproval of the practical consequences of specific
decisions. At an abstract level, there are those who believe that the
Charterenshrines Canada's most important political truths and principles and therefore ought to be interpreted in the most generous manner.
These "charterphiles" applaud the Court's initial activism and see the
36

See below, Table 9 at 35.

37

Monahan, supra, note 2 at 29.
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falling success rate as an unfortunate retreat. On the other hand, there
are those who fear that the Charterwill lead to government by lawsuit,'a
weakening of democratic institutions and habits, and an undue favouring
of individual interests over the collective good. These Chartersceptics
have welcomed the Court's second thoughts about its initial activism and
instances of judicial self-restraint.
A final caveat is in order about the tendency of Beatty and others
to use "liberal" and "conservative" as synonyms for "judicial activism"
and "judicial self-restraint" when discussing the Charter. This usage is as
misleading as it is common. It reflects a simplistic attitude of "the more
rights, the better," an attitude that fails to grasp either the complexity or
ambiguity of rights; 8 The wrong-headedness of this common practice
can be illustrated by comparing judges with legislators. It is simply
perverse to describe a politician who supports state intervention to
regulate or redistribute private power as a liberal, and to simultaneously
describe a judge who strikes down such laws as a liberal. Similarly, it is
hardly clear why a politician who votes against interventionist, statist
projects should be described as a conservative, while a self-restrained
judge who votes to uphold the same laws is described as a conservative.
Judicial activism and judicial self-restraint denote the willingness or
reluctance of judges to use the power of judicial review to revise or
obstruct the decisions of legislatures and the executive. They may be
used with equal facility for either conservative or liberal ends. There is
thus nothing to be gained and much to be lost by conflating the two sets
of terms.
To conclude, these first one hundred decisions clearly indicate
that the Charterhas ushered in a new era of judicial activism unimagined
in pre-CharterCanada. Whether the Court has exercised this new power
for liberal or conservative ends tends to be area specific-for example,
abortion, law enforcement, labour law, language policy, etcetera-and
thus beyond the scope of this paper.

38 This problem is clearly explained by A. Petter & A.C. Hutchinson, "Rights in Conflict: The
Dilemma of Charter Legitimacy" (1989) 23 U.B.C. L. Rev. 531 at 548.
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IV. TREATMENT OF COURTS OF APPEAL
With the exception of one reference by the federal
government,3 9 all of the Supreme Court's first one hundred Charter
decisions have come on appeal from intermediary courts of appeal. This
permits a comparison of the Supreme Court's decisions with those of the
lower appeal courts in the same sets of cases. As indicated by Table 3,
68 percent-or about two of every three-of the Charter decisions
appealed from the lower courts have been upheld by the Supreme Court.
This figure contrasts sharply with the comparable American figure. In
its 169 Bill of Rights decisions during this same time period, the
American Supreme Court overturned 111 lower court decisions. 40 This
contrast suggests that the American Court makes more strategic use of
its discretion to choose which appeals to hear; that is, it selects cases that
it initially intuits as "mistakes" that should be given a hard second look.
The American Court's more critical screening process may be explained
by the much higher demand for its services-over 5,000 appeal requests
annually. By comparison, the Canadian Supreme Court selects its 100 to
125 cases a year from only 400 appeal petitions. 41 It can thus afford to
be more generous with its discretion to grant leave to appeal.
The 68 percent "upheld" figure for Charter decisions is
marginally higher than the global average for all Supreme Court
decisions during this same time period. Between 1982 and 1989, the
Supreme Court heard 559 appeals and dismissed 59 percent of them.42
This means that, for courts of appeal in general, the Charteris not posing
any new or special problems in their relationship with the Supreme
Court.

39

Reference Re ManitobaLanguageRights, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 347.
40 Spaeth, supra,note 6.
41 See S.I. Bushnell, "Leave to Appeal Applications: The 1987-88 Term" (1989) 11 Sup. Ct L.
Rev. 383 at 386. Bushnell's series of studies of how the Supreme Court exercises its discretionary
control of its docket shows that the number of leave to appeal applications to the Supreme Court
grew exponentially during the 1970s-from 150 to over 400-but levelled off and even fell during
the 1980s.
42 This data was provided upon the authors' request by P. McCormick, University of
Lethbridge.
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TABLE 3

The Supreme Court's Treatment of Courts of Appeals' Charter Decisions
Number of Charter Decisions
Reversed
Upheld

British Columbiaa
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
Quebec
New Brunswick
NovaScotia
Prince Edward Island
Newfoundland
Federal Court
Total

Total

% Upheld

17
9
5
4
25
7
1
1
1
1
3

2
4
2
2
6
11
1
2
1
1
2

19
13
7
6
31
19b
2
3
2
2
5

89%
69%
71%
67%
81%
37%
50%
33%
50%
50%
60%

74

34

109C

68%

a. Includes one decision made by Yukon Court of Appeal.
b. Includes one case upheld in part, reversed in part.
c. Totals more than one hundred decisions because it includes ten additional
Supreme Court Charter decisions which were not counted in this study due to the
fact that they raised the same issues as cases that were already counted. Because
they originated in different courts of appeal, however, they are included in Table 3.
See Appendix 1 for coding rules. Total is 109, rather than 100, because one decision
came as a reference directly from the federal government, with no lower court
decision to review.

However, as Table 3 also shows, the reversal rates have varied
quite widely for the different courts of appeal. The most remarkable
difference is the very high reversal rate (63 percent) in appeals from
Quebec. Only Nova Scotia has a reversal rate even close to Quebec's,
but that is for only three cases. Charter ideology alone cannot account
for the relative frequency with which the Supreme Court has reversed
Quebec's Court of Appeal. The courts of appeal whose Charter
decisions have been most frequently upheld by the Supreme
Court-British Columbia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan-differ widely in
their Charter profiles. British Columbia's Court of Appeal has been
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fairly self-restrained, Saskatchewan's fairly activist, and Ontario's in the

middle.4 3 The Charteractivism or self-restraint of an appeal court is thus
not an accurate predictor of how its decisions will be reviewed by the

Supreme Court.
Table 4 presents a closer look at those thirty-five Supreme Court
Charterdecisions that reversed lower court of appeal decisions. The
number of reversals in favour of the Charterclaimant (twenty-two) were

twice as numerous as those favouring the Crown (eleven). Thus, when
the Court did reverse lower court decisions, it was much more likely to
do so in favour of the individual. This also means that for this set of one
hundred cases, the Supreme Court supported the Charterclaimant more

frequently (35 per cent) than the appeal courts collectively (24 per cent).
TABLE 4
Outcome of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions
that Reversed Appeal Court Decisions
CharterClaimant
Source of
Appeal

Wins

Losses

Inconclusive

Total

British Columbia

2

0

0

2

Alberta

3

1

0

4

Saskatchewan

1

1

0

2

Manitoba

2

1

0

3

Ontario

3

2

1

6

Quebec

5

5

1

11

New Brunswick

1

0

0

1

Nova Scotia

2

0

0

2

Prince Edward Island
Newfoundland

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

1

Federal Court of Appeal

1

1

0

2

22

11

2

35

Total

43 According to data generated by the CharterDatabase Project at the University of Calgary,
the Crown has won 83 percent of the 168 reported Charterdecisions in the B.C. Court of Appeal; 63
percent of the 85 decisions in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal; and 73 percent of the 223
reported decisions in the Ontario Court of Appeal. The average for all courts of appeal is 76
percent. The figure for the Quebec Court of Appeal is 62 percent, but this is based on only 20
reported decisions, which we believe is considerably less than it should be.
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As for the Quebec Court of Appeal, Table 4 reconfirms that
Charterideology cannot account for a court of appeal's fate before the
Supreme Court. The latter's eleven reversals of Quebec decisions are
evenly divided in favour of the Crown (five) and Charterclaimants (five).
This high reversal rate for its Charter decisions is consistent with
Quebec's overall record on appeal in recent years, in which more than
by the Supreme
half of its decisions have been overturned on appeal 44
Court of Canada-the third poorest record of all courts.
The reasons for this are unclear, but may be linked to the civil
law training and orientation of the judges on the Quebec Court of
Appeal as opposed to the common law orientation of the majority of
Supreme Court of Canada Justices. In their controversial decision in the
Daigle abortion injunction case, for example, the majority of the Quebec
Court gave a very literal reading to the term "human being" (6tre
humain), a practice consistent with the civil law tradition of strict judicial
fidelity to the letter of the law.45 The Supreme Court of Canada
reversed this decision and specifically rejected what it called a
"dictionary" approach to legal interpretation. 46 Rather, the Supreme
Court built their decision on a combination of precedents, legislative
intent, and judicial notice, all of which are alien to the civil law tradition.
The two conflicting Daigle decisions do suggest a clash between civil law
to the
and common law judicial norms. This clash may have contributed
47
appeals.
on
record
poorer
generally
Appeal's
of
Court
Quebec
The other remarkable fact about Quebec Charterappeals to the
Supreme Court is how few of them there have been-barely half the
number from Ontario, less than from British Columbia, and just a few
more than from Alberta. This may reflect a more general tendency for
Quebeckers to view and to use the Charter less than citizens of other

44 According to data provided upon the authors' request by P. McCormick, University of
Lethbridge, the Supreme Court upheld only 45 percent of all Quebec decisions that it reviewed on
appeal between 1982 and 1989. The only appeal courts with worse records were New Brunswick (37

percent) and P.E.I. (33 percent; n=3).
45 Tremblayv. Daigle, [1989] RJ.Q. 1735,59 D.L.R. (4th) 609.
46

Daiglev. Tremblay, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530 [hereinafter Daigle].

47 See P.H. Russell, The Supreme Court as a Bilingual-BiculturalInstitution (Ottawa: Crown

Printers, 1969) at 121 (Table IV.3).
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provinces, 48 suggesting a cleavage between Francophone Quebec and
the rest of Canada in attitudes toward the Charter-atendency on which
we will comment in more detail below.
V. TREATMENT OF DIFFERENT CHARTER RIGHTS
Table 5 shows which Charterrights and freedoms have formed
the basis of the Supreme Court's first one hundred decisions and how
they were decided. We have classified each of the one hundred cases
according to the right or freedom on which the case primarily turned and
the outcome in terms of whether claimants achieved the practical
objective of their litigation. In civil cases, a "win" means the Charter
claimant received the remedy requested-the nullification of a statute or
regulation, a declaratory judgment, an injunction, and so forth. In
criminal cases also, a "win" means the Court awarded the Charter
claimant/accused the remedy requested-the exclusion of evidence, the
nullification of a statute, a reinstatement of a verdict of not guilty, an
order for a new trial, and so forth. In cases where the Charterclaimant
received some, but not all of the remedies requested, the result of the
case is coded as "inconclusive."

48 At present, this is only a hypothesis. The Charter Database Project currently lists only about
200 reported cases from Quebec, far fewer than any other major province. However, some
preliminary consultations with Quebec law reports suggests that this represents a serious underreporting of Quebec Charter cases in the English language law reports-perhaps by as many as 400
cases.
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TABLE 5
Different Categories of Charter Cases by Result
CharterClaimant
Losses
Wins

Inconclusive

Total

Fundamental
Freedoms

5

11

0

16

Democratic
Rights

0

0

0

0

Mobility
Rights

1

2

0

3

27

42

5

74

1

4

0

5

4

3

0

7

Aboriginal
Rightsc

0

0

0

0

Total

38

62

5

105 d

Legal Rightsa
Equality
Rights
Languageand
Education Rightsb

a. Including s. 23(2).
b. Includes ss. 16-23 of the Charter, ss. 93 and 133 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867,
s. 23 of the Manitoba Act, S.C. 1870, c. 3 and s. 16 of the Saskatchewan Act,
S.C. 1905, c. 42.
c. Includes s. 25 of the Charterand s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
d. The following five cases are counted in two categories, thus making the total
number of cases 105:
R. v. Morgentaler:Legal Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
Black v. Law Society of Alberta: Fundamental Freedoms and Mobility Rights
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. A.G. Quebec: Fundamental Freedoms and Legal Rights
Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.): Fundamental
Freedoms and Equality Rights
Borowski v. A.G. Canada:Legal Rights and Equality Rights

Table 5 clearly shows the extent to which legal rights cases have
dominated the Court's Charter agenda-74 of its first one hundred
decisions. This trend has been evident from early on. Most
commentators agree that it favours both the Court and the Charter,as
judicial expertise and authority are highest in this area. Also, legal rights
cases arise predominantly in the making and enforcement of criminal
law-a purely federal jurisdiction-and thus tend not to become

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 NO.

1

embroiled in the politics of federalism or language. This is not to
minimize the importance or extent of the changes effected by the Court
in this area. As Manfredi has shown, criminal process issues contain
important substantive dimensions. 49 The Court has used the Charterto
develop a new constitutional code of conduct for Canadian police
officers in dealing with suspects and accused persons. In the process, it
has pushed the Canadian criminal process away from the "crime
control" toward the "due process" side of the ledgerP0 Ironically, while
this policy area represents the Court's most extensive de facto efforts at
law reform, it has thus far escaped public notice. American experience
shows that this type of judicial policy making can become an issue of
partisan political conflict. Beginning with Richard Nixon's 1968
presidential campaign, the Republican Party has criticized liberal judges
for being "soft on criminals" and successfully exploited the "law and
order" issue, particulary as it relates to the appointment of federal
judges. 51 It will be of both theoretical and practical interest to see if a
Canadian political party will try to make a political issue out of the
Supreme Court's Charterinspired reform of the criminal law process.
Fundamental freedoms are a distant second, accounting for
sixteen cases. The distinctively Canadian sections of the Charter
-mobility rights and language rights-have generated only three and
seven cases, respectively. On the other hand, they have been relatively
more successful than the other sections. The two unsuccessful mobility
rights cases dealt with the extradition of criminals 52 and the rights of noncitizens 53 -issues peripheral to the nation-building objectives of the
49 C. Manfredi, "Human Dignity and the Psychology of Interrogation in Miranda v.Arizona"
(1986) 1 Can. J. L. & Soc. 109 at 124.
50 The crime control perspective emphasizes the punishment of the guilty while the due
process model emphasizes the protection of the innocent. These differences lead to equally
different views of the relative value of legal rights. From the crime control perspective, the
efficiency of the detection, conviction, and punishment of crime is the guiding principle. The due
process model emphasizes procedural protection for the accused and considers efficiency of
secondary importance. See H.L. Packer, "Two Models of the Criminal Process" (1964) 113 U. Pa.
L Rev. 10.
51 See F.L. Morton, "Judicial Review and Conservatism in Canada and the United States" in
B. Cooper, A. Kornberg & W. Mishler, eds, The Resurgence of Conservatism in Anglo-American

Democracies (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1968) 163 at 184.
52 US.A. v. Cotroni;USA. v. ElZein, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469 [hereinafter Cotrom].
53

Law Society of Upper Canadav. Skapinker,[1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.
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primary author of section 6, Pierre Trudeau. By contrast, the one
successful section 6 case struck down Alberta's restrictions on nonresident lawyers and law firms, precisely the type of interprovincial
barrier targeted by Trudeau. Within months of the decision, almost
every major law firm in Alberta had announced mergers or associations
with large Toronto based firms.
Nor do the small number of language rights cases accurately
reflect their considerable political impact. The Court's 1984 decision in
Quebec ProtestantSchool Boards54 forced the Quebec' government to
realize that they had lost control of education and culture, and gave
them the incentive to enter into new negotiations with Ottawa, which led
eventually to the 1987 Meech Lake Accord. The Supreme Court's 1988
decisions dealing with language rights in Saskatchewan, Alberta, and
Quebec,5s and the political responses that they provoked, have in turn
contributed heavily to the demise of Meech Lake. In both instances, the
Supreme Court affirmed the existence of minority language rights, and,
in both instances, the governments affected enacted new legislation
negating the judicial rulings. Critics of Meech Lake seized upon
Quebec's use of the section 33 override as an indicator of what to expect
under the "distinct society" clause.
Section 15, the multi-pronged equality rights section, did not
come into force until 1985. While it has flooded the lower courts with
litigation, s 6 it has not yet had much of an impact at the Supreme Court
level. However, now that the Court has begun in Andrews57 to lay the
foundations of equality rights jurisprudence, a larger proportion of cases
coming before the Court will likely deal with equality rights.

54A.G. Quebec v. QuebecAssociation of ProtestantSchool Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66.

55 Mercure v.A.G. Saskatchewan, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234; Fordv.A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712
[hereinafter Ford];and Devine v.A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R 790 [hereinafter Devine].
56 See F.L. Morton & MJ.Withey, "Charting the Charter,1982-1985: A Statistical Analysis"
(1987) Can. Hum. Rts Y.B. 65. See also G. Brodsky & S. Day, CanadianCharterEqualityRightsfor

Women: One Step Forwardor Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status
of Women, 1989).
57

Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 [hereinafterAndrews].
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VI. NULLIFICATION OF STATUTES
Section 32 of the Charter declares that its enumerated
prohibitions apply to "all matters within the authority" of Parliament
and the legislatures of each of the provinces. Cases such as Dolphin
Delivey 5 s and Daigle59 show that occasionally it is difficult to say where
"state action"-and thus the reach of the Charter-endsand "private
action" begins. As a basic rule, however, Charter litigation can be
directed at three forms of government actions: primary legislation or
statutes; secondary legislation or administrative rules and regulations;
and the conduct of government officials. Table 6 presents a breakdown
of the Court's first one hundred Charter decisions according to the
"object" of the challenge.
TABLE 6
Object of CharterChallenge by Result of Case
CharterClaimant
Wins
Losses

Statute
Conduct
Regulation

18
18
2

29
32
1

Inconclusive

Total

2
1
0

49
51

3

Total

38
62
3
103*
*Total is greater than one hundred because some Chartercases involve challenges to
both statute and conduct, or both statute and regulation, etc.

Executive conduct has been under review in just over 50 percent
of the Court's Charter cases. This is significantly lower than the
proportion for Chartercases generally. Earlier studies by both Morton 60
and Monahan 61 found that two out of every three Charter cases are
challenges to conduct, usually the actions of the police in the
58 Supra, note 35.
59

Supra, note 46.

60

Morton & Withey, supra, note 56 at 72.

61 Monahan, supra, note 2 at 38.
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enforcement of criminal law. The Supreme Court, it appears, has been
more willing to grant leave to appeal when statutes are challenged than
when conduct is challenged.
This has implications for the new role of the Court under the
Charter. If the Supreme Court followed the trend of the lower courts
and primarily heard conduct cases, it would reduce the potential for
direct clashes between the Court and legislatures over the substantive
policy choices implicit in most Charterchallenges to statutes. It would
also weaken the anti-democratic critique of judicial review. The Court's
decision to hear a roughly equal number of statute and conduct cases
has thrust it into a more competitive relationship with Parliament and
provincial legislatures, and made the legitimacy issue more explicit and
thus more difficult to ignore. 62 This may have been a contributing factor
to the end of the Court's initial Charter honeymoon described above.
The legitimacy issue becomes even sharper when we focus on the judicial
nullification of statutes, the subject of Table 7.
TABLE 7
Nullification of Federal and Provincial Statutes
Upheld

Nullified

Total

Statute
Federal

16

8

24

Provincial

15

11

26

Total

31

19

50

Table 7 shows that in the seven years since its adoption, the
Supreme Court has used the Charterto strike down a total of nineteen
statutes in whole or in part. Remarkably, this figure is almost identical
with the number of statutes declared invalid by the u.s. Supreme Court
for Bill of Rights violations during the same time period-twenty. 63
The nineteen Charternullifications also contrast sharply with the
Court's deferential, British-style exercise of judicial review under the
62

The "legitimacy issue" is discussed at length by Monahan, ibid. at c. 3.

63

Spaeth, supra, note 6.
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1960 CanadianBill of Rights. Under the latter, the Court struck down
only one statute in twenty-two years-a section of the Indian Act64
which restricted drinking rights on reserves. 65 The magnitude of this
change can be appreciated by comparing this figure to the number of
statutes declared ultra vires on federalism grounds during the same time
frame, only ten in thirty-one cases. 66 The Charterhas clearly replaced
federalism as the primary basis for the Court's exercise of judicial
review.
More provincial legislation (eleven statutes) has been declared
invalid under the Charterthan federal (eight statutes). This is consistent
with Morton's earlier study of all appeal court nullifications under the
Charter, which found that the quantitative impact of the Charter on
federal and provincial statutes was roughly equal, but that there were
some interesting qualitative differences. 67 The invalidated provincial
statutes tended to be of a substantive character and more recently
enacted. The same trend is present in the federal and provincial statutes
declared invalid by the Supreme Court, which are presented in Table 8.

64 R.S.C. 1952, c. 149, s. 94(b).
65
See Drybones,supra, note 8.
66

The ten cases involve declarations of ultra vires or inapplicability: Re Upper Churchill Water
Rights Revision Act, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297; Goldwax v. Montreal (City of), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 525; Deloiltte,
Haskins & Sells v. Workers' Compensation Board, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 785; Derrickson v. Derickson,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 285; Paulv. Paul,[1986] 1 S.C.R. 306; Scowby v. Glendenning [1986] 2 S.C.R. 227;
Bell Canadav. Quebec, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 740; CanadianNationalRailway Co. v. Courtois, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 869;Alltrans ErpressLtd v. British Columbia (Workers' CompensationBoard), [1988] 1 S.C.R.
97; and Clarkv. CanadianNationalRailway Co., [1988] 2 S.C.R. 680.
67 F.L. Morton et al., "Judicial Nullification of Statutes under the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, 1982-1988" (1990) 28 Alta. L. Rev. 396 at 426.
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Seven of the eight nullifications of federal statutes were
procedural in character and half were based on the legal rights
provisions of the Charter. By contrast, nine of the eleven nullifications of
provincial statutes were substantive in character, and seven of them were
based directly or indirectly on French/English minority language and
education issues, a perennial source of conflict in Canadian politics.68
Table 8 shows that five of the eight invalidated federal statutes
involved criminal law. Parliament's exclusive power over criminal law
makes federal legislation in Canada a prime target for Charter
challenges. This contrasts with the United States, where the states have
the primary responsibility for making criminal law. As a result, the
American Supreme Court's application of the Bill of Rights, via the
Fourteenth Amendment, 69 applies primarily to the states. As noted
above, most of the federal legislation overturned by the Court on Charter
grounds has involved procedural issues rather than policy concerns.
The major exceptions, and they are major, were the Singh 7o and
Morgentaler7 l decisions. The latter is the most famous-or infamous
-Charter decision to date. Morgentaler overturned the abortion
provisions of the CriminalCode72 and forced the Mulroney government
to deal with the politically charged abortion issue. The government
struggled for more than two years to frame a new abortion policy. In
May 1990, after several failed attempts, the House of Commons in a free
vote adopted Bill C-43,73 a compromise measure that left abortion in the
Criminal Code, but allowed therapeutic abortions when a pregnancy
threatened the life or health of the mother. Bill C-43 abolished the old
requirement of committee approvals and left the determination of the
threat to health to a woman and her doctor. In this respect, it closely

68 The 1988 French-only public signs cases were decided on section 2(b) "freedom of
expression" grounds, but the freedom involved was the freedom to advertise and do business in
English. See Ford and Devine, supra, note 55.
69 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
70

Singh v. Min isterof Employment andImmigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.

71

R. v. Morgentaler,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.

72 CriminalCode, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 251.
73 Bill C-43, An Act RespectingAbortion, 2d Sess., 34th ParI., 1989-90-91 (rejected 31 January

1991).
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followed Chief Justice Dickson's judgment in the Morgentalerdecision.74
In January 1991, however, an evenly divided Senate defeated Bill C-43.75
The government promptly announced that it would not introduce new
legislation. The legal vacuum created by the government's inaction has
led to a variety of different provincial responses to the funding and
access issues, and also to a series of abortion injunction cases. The most
dramatic, Daigle,76 went all the way to the Supreme Court for an
unprecedented emergency hearing during the summer recess of 1989.
The Singh decision is less well known, but hardly less dramatic in
its effects. Singh struck down the procedures for hearing applications for
refugee status under the ImmigrationAct 77 and forced the government to
provide a mandatory oral hearing for refugee applicants. This decision
has had the unintended consequences of creating a backlog of 124,000
refugee claimants, an amnesty for 15,000 claimants already in Canada,
$179 million in additional costs, and a new refugee law that some critics
say is more unfair than the original one.78 The new refugee law took
effect 1 January 1989. Eighteen months later, the government
announced that the new Immigration and Refugee Board would quadruple its capacity to keep up with applications. This would allow the
Board to hire an additional 280 public servants (to add to the present
496) at an additional cost of $20 million. This increase brings the annual
budget of the new Board to $80 million. 79
Only five provinces have lost legislation to Charter challenges:
Quebec, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. Of
the five, Quebec has clearly been most affected. Not only has it had the
highest number of nullifications (five), but the statutes affected
represented recent policy initiatives that were important to the Quebec
government-all but one in the fields of language and education. By
74 See F.L. Morton, "The Meaning of Morgentaler: A Political Analysis" in I. Gentles, ed.,A
Time to Choose Life: Women, Abortion, and Human Rights (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1990)

168.
75 The vote on third reading was 43-43. Under Senate rules, a tie vote defeats the legislation.
76

Supra, note 46.

77

1mmigrationAct 1976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss 2,3(g), 4,5,23,27,32,37,45-48,55, and 70-72.
78 See Mandel, supra, note 2 at 172-73 and F.L. Morton, "The Public Cost of Charter
Decisions" The FinancialPost(30 January 1990) 14.
79

V. Malarek, "Refugee Processing Expected to Improve" The [Toronto] Globe and Mail (23

June 1990) A3.
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contrast, none of the other provincial legislation overturned represented
recent policy commitments considered important by the provincial
governments. For Quebec, the Court's decisions striking down various
sections of Bill 10180 were serious policy defeats.81
In one sense, Quebec presents the clearest example of the
counter-majoritarian character of judicial review, where the Court uses
the Charterto protect the rights of a local minority against the local
majority. From a different perspective, however, the same decisions,
particulary in conjunction with the language rights cases from Manitoba
and Saskatchewan, show how the Charter,through the Supreme Court,
can serve as a vehicle for majoritarian democracy rather than a
limitation on it. The American comparison is instructive on this point.
In the United States, seven times more state laws (970) have been
declared unconstitutional than federal laws (135).82 In the same time
period as our study (1984-89), eighteen state statutes and only two
federal statutes were declared invalid for violating the Bill of Rights.83
Leading American commentators argue that, rather than being a
restraint on Congress and the president, the American Supreme Court
has more often been "an active participant in the ruling national
coalitions that dominate American politics," 84 especially when it comes
to curbing state or local policies that are offensive to the ruling national
coalition. The u.s. Supreme Court's lead in attacking racial segregation
in the South is only the most well known example of the use of judicial
review to restrain "aberrant" behaviour of regional majorities. The
Canadian Supreme Court's activist promotion of national bilingualism at
the expense of the preferred unilingual policies of some provincial
governments also supports Shapiro's broader comparative thesis that the
primary function of judicial review is not legal but political-to assist
80 Charterof the FrenchLanguage, R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-11 [hereinafter Bill 101].
81 There is yet another ironic American parallel here. The state that has had the most statutes

declared invalid by the American Supreme Court is Louisiana, a state whose original settlers came
from French Canada, and still the only civil law state in the U.S. See H.J. Abraham, The Judicial
Process: An IntroductoryAnalysis of the Courts of the United States, England,and France (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986) at 293.
82 ]bid. The figures are current through the summer of 1985.
83 Spaeth, supra, note 6. Of the 18 state statutes, four were municipal ordinances.
84 See R.A. Dahl, "Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National

Policy-Maker" (1957) 6 J.Pub. L. 279 at 295.
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central authorities to overrule local norms and to impose national
policies in their place. 85
The greater impact of the Charteron provincial law making also
supports earlier predictions about the potential of the Charterto act as a
force for policy uniformity throughout Canada.8 6 Whether this will serve
a nation-building function, as its proponents hoped, or be a politically
divisive influence, remains to be seen. Judicially mandated policies
pleasing to the central authorities often do not sit well with local governments. Within Quebec, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in
the "French-only" public signs cases87 triggered a significant increase in
support for Bill 101 and restrictions on English language signs. Support
for the separatist Parti Quibdcois jumped 8 percent, while support for
bilingualism was cut in half.88 Outside of Quebec, Premier Bourassa's
use of the section 33 override to reinstate restrictions on English language advertising was widely criticized and contributed to the eventual
defeat of the Meech Lake Accord. Critics of the Accord effectively
argued that the distinct society clause would be used to insulate
Quebec's attempts to promote French and suppress English from
successful Charterchallenges.
The bitter debate over the distinct society clause reflects the
Charter'sdisproportionate impact on Quebec. Research conducted in
1987 showed that while the Charterwas as popular in Quebec as in the
rest of Canada among those who knew about it, considerably fewer
people knew about the Charter in Quebec than elsewhere in the
country.8 9 The introduction of the Charter without the Quebec
85

M. Shapiro, Courts: A ComparativeandPoliticalAnalysis(Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1981) at 24.
86 See P.H. Russell, "The Political Purposes of the Canadian CharterofRights and Freedon&'
(1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 31. Also see R. Knopff & F.L. Morton, "Nation-Building and the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms" in A. Cairns & C. Williams, eds, Constitutionalism,Citizenship and Society
in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 133 at 183.
87
See Ford and Devine, supra,note 55.
88 J.H. Guy, R. Nadeau & E. Cloutier, "La crise linguistique au Qubec: une 6tude du
mouvement de l'opinion publique engendr6 par le jugement de la Cour supreme sur I'affichage
commercial" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association,
Victoria, B.C., May 1990) [unpublished].
89 See P. Sniderman et al., "Political Culture and the Problem of Double Standards: Mass and
Elite Attitudes Toward Language Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1989)
22 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 259 at 284.
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government's consent and subsequent developments in judicial and
constitutional politics may make the Charter less attractive to
Francophone Quebeckers. The Supreme Court's decisions overturning
key elements of Quebec's Bill 101 and the hostility- directed against
Quebec for using the override clause to protect Bill 17890 from Charter
challenge may contribute to a political environment in which the Charter
is increasingly seen by the Qu~bjcois as a constitutional instrument
hostile to their primary constitutional concerns.
VII. JUDICIAL DISCRETION: REASONABLE LIMITATIONS
AND THE EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Frequently in Chartercases, after the Court has found that a
right has been violated, it goes on to a second stage of analysis to
consider whether the law abridging the right is a "reasonable limit"
under section 1 or whether, if it is a criminal case, the evidence should
be excluded under section 24(2). Both these types of second stage
determinations are crucial to the practical outcome of Chartercases.
They are also both highly discretionary, and thus reliable indicators of
judicial self-restraint or activism. Tables 9 and 10 present data on the
outcome of these second stage determinations in Supreme Court
decision making. The most significant feature of both tables is the
contrast in outcomes between the early years and more recent years,
evidence which further supports the thesis that after an initial burst of
activism, the Court has moved toward a practice of greater self-restraint.
Section 1 states that the rights and freedoms enumerated in the
Charterare "subject to such reasonable limitations prescribed by law as
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Rather
than treat this as a self-evident, declaratory truth (that is, no right is
absolute), the Court has made section 1 an integral step in Charter
interpretation. If the Court finds that the statute in question restricts a
Charterright, the judges then proceed to determine if this limitation is
"reasonable" and "demonstrably justifiable." In its 1986 Oakes
decision, 91 the Court laid down specific guidelines for applying section 1.
The Oakes guidelines require that to qualify as a reasonable limitation,
90
91

AnActto.Amend the Charterofthe FrenchLanguage, S.Q. 1988, c. 54.
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.CR. 103 [hereinafter Oakes].
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the statute must serve a "pressing and substantial" purpose and that the
means used must be proportional to the ends. The Oakes guidelines may
have structured judicial discretion, but they certainly have not removed
it.92 In practice, Oakes amounts to a form of judicial balancing of ends
and means: do the former justify the latter? Since the practical outcome
of a case rides on this section 1 determination, a judge's sensitivity to
what Justice La Forest has called "second guessing" legislative choices, 93
is likely to influence how deferential or strict he or she is in applying the
Oakes test. How then has the Court exercised its discretion under
section 1?
Table 9 shows that, from 1984 through 1987, only one of eleven
section 1 defenses of legislation was accepted by the Court. This is
consistent with-indeed it supports-the Court's initial activism. It may
also reflect the unpreparedness of government lawyers for section 1
arguments, specifically the use of extrinsic evidence (for example, social
data) to support the reasonableness of the challenged statute.94 By
contrast, in 1988 and 1989, the Court accepted eight of fourteen section
1 defenses. In practical terms, this means that the Charterchallenge
failed. The Court has also become divided over the treatment of section
1. There have been only four dissents in cases in which section 1 was
decisive, and three of these occurred in 1989. 95 Also, the Justices differ
in the consistency with which they use Oakes in responding to section 1
arguments.9 6

92 For a persuasive critique of the inherently subjective character of section 1 determinations,
see S.R. Peck, "An Analytical Framework for Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1.
93

Justice La Forest, concurring opinion in R. v. Edwards Books andArt Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R.

713 [hereinafter Edwards Books].

94 It is generally accepted that section 1 requires some empirical evidence, not just a
government's assertion, as to the compelling need for the law and the means used. See P.W. Hogg,
CanadaAct 1982Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 10.
95 Edwards Books, supra, note 93; Andrews, supra, note 57; Cotroni, supra, note 52; and
Edmonton Journalv. A.G. Alberta, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
96
See below, Table 16 at 43.
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TABLE 9
The Section 1 Reasonable Limits Defence by Year

Section 1 Defence
Accepted
Rejected
Total

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Total

0
2

0
4

1
2

0
2

5
4

3
2

9
16

2

4

3

2

9

5

25

Table 10 reveals a similar trend for the exclusion of evidence
under section 24(2). This section represents a significant and potentially
controversial innovation in Canadian criminal law. Prior to 1982,
Canadian judges usually accepted Crown evidence, even if police
obtained it in a manner that violated the rights of the accused.9 7 This
was consistent with British practice, but diverged significantly from the
American practice initiated by the u.s. Supreme Court's 1966 decision,
Mapp v. Ohio,98 to exclude evidence from trial if the police had violated
the rights of the accused. In practice, this often meant an acquittal, since
it was difficult to obtain a conviction without the evidence. After much
controversy, the framers of the Charteradopted a compromise wording
that would make the exclusion of evidence conditional upon the judges'
finding that the admission of evidence "would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute." Since this determination is far from selfevident, the practical effect of section 24(2) was dependant on how the
Supreme Court interpreted it.
From 1984 through 1986, the Court accepted the only two
exclusion motions that it heard. Since 1987, it has evenly divided on
section 24(2) motions to exclude, rejecting eight and accepting eight.
Section 24(2) prompted the first dissent 9 9 in the Supreme Court's

97

See R. v. Wray, [1971] S.C.R. 272 and Hoganv. R., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
98 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
99 Le Dain and McIntyre JJ. were the first Charterdissenters in R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
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Charterjurisprudence and has divided the Court in three subsequent
cases-more than any other section of the Charter.100
TABLE 10
Motions to Exclude Evidence
1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Total

Successful

0

1

1

3

2

3

10

Unsuccessful
Issuenot
addressed

0
0

0
0

0
0

3
2

3
3

2
1

8
6

0

1

1

8

8

6

24

Total

The close division in outcomes and the division within the Court
on section 1 and section 24(2) arguments reflects the rather discretionary and subjective nature of applying these sections of the Charter.
Deciding whether legislation is "reasonable" or whether the admission
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence "would bring the administration
of justice into disrepute" are not likely to become precise arts. The
divisions which have developed within the Court over the Court's proper
role under the Chartercan be understood as both the cause and effect of
its changing and divided record on section 1 and section 24(2) issues.
VIII. DIVISIONS WITHIN THE COURT
Since the opening activist honeymoon, the Court has become
increasingly divided in its approach to the Charter. Table 11 shows how
the Supreme Court's initial consensus on interpreting and using the
Charterhas broken down. The percentage of unanimous decisions in
Chartercases has fallen steadily.101 Since 1986, there have been dissents
100

Collins v. R., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; R.v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417; and R. v. Ross, [1989] 1

S.C.R. 3.
101 Unlike Professor Heard, we define "unanimous" with reference only to the outcome of the
case, regardless of concurring opinions.
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in two out of every five Charterdecisions. Meanwhile, the percentage of
unanimous decisions in non-Chartercases has remained relatively steady
10 2
in the 80 percent range, which is the same as pre-Charterpractice.
This means that the growing dissension on the Court is limited to
Chartercases.
TABLE 11

Unanimity in Charter and Non-Charter Cases
CharterDecisions
%
No. of
Unanimous
Decisions

Non-CharterDecisions
. %
No. of
Unanimous
Decisions

1984
1985
1986

4
11
11

100%
82%
55%

59
72
70

88%
83%
89%

1987

23

61%

72

85%

1988
1989

25
26

64%
61%

79
97

85%
77%

65%

449

84%
(n = 377)

100

Total

(n = 65)

A 60 percent unanimity rate is still high by American standards.
During the same time period as our study, the American Supreme Court
was unanimous in only 23.1 percent (39/169) of its Bill of Rights decisions
and 37.7 percent overall (276/732).103 These figures are consistent with
trends over the past four decades. However, prior to the 1930s-that is,
before the Bill of Rights became the most active part of its workload
-the American Court also enjoyed unanimity in over 80 percent of its
decisions.10 4 With the advent of modern judicial review, and its
preoccupation with rights and emphasis on judicial discretion, this

102 See P.H. Russell, The Judiciary in Canada: The Third Branch of Government (Toronto:
McGraw-HiU/Ryerson, 1987) at 351.
103
Spaeth, supra, note 6.
10 4

Abraham, supra, note 81 at 211.
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consensus quickly evaporated. °5 Such increases in dissenting and
concurring opinions also indicate judges who value the Court's political
role over its legal role. It suggests that judges are increasingly willing to
sacrifice the legal value of clarity of law that comes with unanimous
decisions in order to promote their personal understandings of what the
constitution requires or permits in terms of public policy. Since these
conditions now apply in Canada, the declining consensus on the
Canadian Court associated with the advent of the Charter may be only
the beginning of a longer trend toward still greater dissension.
C. Herman Pritchett wrote about the American Supreme Court:
"Dissent is usually not a game played in solitude; the great majority of
all Supreme Court dissents are concurred in by two, three or four
justices." 10 6 While it is true to a lesser degree of the Canadian Supreme
Court, the study of dissenting voting patterns suggests that they are not
random, but reflect a shared judicial philosophy. Table 12 presents the
patterns of interagreement in dissents among the nine Justices who
participated in a substantial number of the Supreme Court of Canada's
first one hundred Charterdecisions.j 07
Justices Wilson and McIntyre have dissented most frequently
-thirteen and eleven times, respectively-but have never dissented
together. Lamer and Dickson are the two Justices who have most
frequently joined Wilson in dissent, while McIntyre has been relatively
isolated in his dissents, with some support from L'Heureux-Dub6, after
she joined the Court in 1987. Heard's recent study found similar

105 The concept of "modem judicial review" has been given a specific meaning by C. Wolfe.
See The Rise ofModern JudicialReview: From ConstitutionalInterpretationto Judge-Made Law (New
York: Basic Books, 1986).
106
Pritchett, supra,note 4 at 32.
107 The top line records the number of cases in which a justice dissented. The columns below
indicate the number of times the other Justices also dissented in the same cases. Solo dissents are
shown in brackets. The table is arranged so that each Judge is placed closest to those with whom he
or she joined in dissent most often and furthest from those with whom they dissented least often. A
difficulty in interpreting levels of interagreement within the Canadian Supreme Court arises from
the fact that the full Court rarely participates in decisions. Indeed, nine Justices participated in only
eight of these first one hundred Chartercases. Thus, to some extent, levels of interagreement may
be affected by the frequency with which Justices participate in the same area. This did not skew the
results presented in Table 12, as Heard, supra, note 3, reached similar results using a different
methodology that avoided this problem.
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patterns of bilateral agreement between
these Judges in all their Charter
108
decisions, not just in their dissents.
TABLE 12

1984-1989

Pattern of Division: Interagreement in Dissents
.=

2

Term

-

3

No. of Dissents

13

9

6

3

Wilson

(5)

4

3

1

Lamer

4

(2)

3

1

Dickson

3

3

()

1

Estey

1
1

1

Beetz

2:,
"

4)

as

1

3

3

1

1

La Forest
L'Heureux-Dub6

1

1

()

1
1
1

(1)

1
1
1

11

1

()
1

.

1

(1)

Le Dain

McIntyre

o

1

1

1

( )

2

2

(5)

Note:
Top row indicates number of dissenting judgments in which each justice participated.
(n) = the number of solo dissents authored by each justice.
n = the number of cases in which the two justices dissented together.

IX. IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JUSTICES
While Table 12 indicates how the Court has divided over Charter
interpretation, it does not provide any information as to the direction of
the division. Tables 13 and 14 leave no doubt about the ideological
nature of the cleavage within the Court. Wilson and Lamer are at the
more activist end of the Court, while McIntyre and L'Heureux-Dub6
have been the Justices most inclined to favour judicial self-restraint.
Table 13 shows the vote orientation of the Justices in all of their Charter
108 See Heard, supra,note 3.
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decisions-unanimous as well as split decisions. Wilson has supported
the Charterclaimant in over half the cases she has participated in-a
startling 53 percent. At the other extreme are L'Heureux-Dub6 (15
percent) and McIntyre (23 percent), both less than half the rate of
Wilson. Lamer, at 47 percent, is closest to Wilson, followed by Estey at
47 percent. The rest of the Justices fall into a wide middle ground
ranging from 30 percent (La Forest) to 39 percent (Beetz). The Court
average is 35 percent.
TABLE 13
Judges' Support for CharterClaimant by Year
1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

Total

Wilson

75%
n=4

70%
n=10

73%
n=11

52%
n=21

44%
n=16

31%
n=16

53%
n=78

Lamer

75%
n=4

69%
n=11

44%
n=9

42%
n=19

55%
n=18

28%
n=18

47%
n=79

Dickson

75%
n=4

69%
n=11

30%
n=10

35%
n=20

33%
n=18

15%
n=13

37%
n=76

Estey

75%
n=4

56%
n=9

38%
n=8

44%
n=9

25%
n=4

Beetz
Le Dain

La Forest
L'Heureux-

Dub6
McIntyre
The Court

-

47%
n=34

75%

75%

11%

25%

31%

67%

39%

n=4

n=8

n=9

n=16

n=16

n=6

n=59

100%
n=1

57%
n=7

22%
n=9

33%
n=18

29%
n=7

-

36%
n=42

75%

33%

33%

30%

26%

24%

30%

n=4

n=3

n=6

n=20

n=19

n=17

n=69

-

-

-

0%

18%

14%

15%

n=ll
5%

n=14
25%

n=26
23%
n=74

75%

45%

30%

n=l
14%

n=4

n=11

n=10

n=22

n=19

n=8

75%

64%

27%

26%

32%

31%

35%

n=4

n=ll

n=11

n=23

n=25

n=26

n=100

Note:
n = number of cases in which a justice participated.
%= percent of n in which a justice supported the Charterclaimant.
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Table 14 indicates the same pattern with regard to dissents in
split decisions. All of Wilson's and Lamer's dissents have come in
decisions in which the Charterclaimant has lost, whereas all but one of
McIntyre's and L'Heureux-Dub6's dissents have been in cases in which
the majority has favoured the Charterclaimant.
TABLE 14
Vote Orientation: Dissents
Number
of Dissents

Wilson
Lamer
Dickson
Estey
Beetz
Le Dain
La Forest
L'HeureuxDub6
McIntyre
Total

Outcome of Majority Decision
Individual
State
Wins
Wins

13
9
6
3
3
1
3
3

0
0
1
1
1
1
1
2

13
9
5
2
2
0
2
1

11

10

1

52

17

35

It is interesting to observe the position of the then Chief Justice
Dickson. Certainly, his voting record in Tables 12 and 13 shows that he
has leaned towards the more activist end of the Court and has been
more inclined than any other Justice to join Wilson and Lamer. On the
other hand, he has not isolated himself at that end of the Court and has
been able to play the role of an activist leaning leader on the Court.
Evidence for this can be found in the fact that his overall voting record
of favouring the Charterclaimant in 37 percent of his decisions is almost
the same as the overall Court average. Also, he has never dissented by
himself.
Tables 15 through 17 throw further light on the ideological
differences within the Court. Table 15 records the tendency of the
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Justices' dissenting and concurring opinions to give a broader or
narrower interpretation of the Charter. This table includes concurring
opinions which are often written to mark out a significant departure
from the interpretation advanced in the main opinion on either the
majority or dissenting side. Hence, it is likely to give a fuller picture of
the orientation of a Justice's Charterjurisprudence. Table 15 shows an
even sharper cleavage than the voting tables. Whereas not one of the
concurring and dissenting opinions of L'Heureux-Dub6 and McIntyre
supported a broader interpretation of the Charter section in question, all
but three of those in which Wilson, Lamer, and Dickson have participated argue for a wider interpretation.
TABLE 15

Direction of Charter Interpretation in Dissenting and Concurring Opinions
Broader

Narrower

Same

Wilson

28

2

1

Lamer

11

1

4

Dickson

12

1

3

Estey

2

4

1

Beetz

1

4

5

Le Dain
La Forest

2
5

4
5

2
2

L'Heureux-Dub6

0

3

0

McIntyre

0

16

6

Tables 16 and 17 are a further index of judicial activism and judicial selfrestraint. They focus on how the Justices have responded to second
stage Charter decisions based on the section 1 reasonable limitations
defence and section 24(2) motions to exclude unconstitutionally
obtained evidence. The willingness of a Justice to accept a section 1
defence of a statute that he or she has already found to limit a Charter
right is an important indicator of self-restraint. Table 16 shows that
L'Heureux-Dub6 and La Forest were the Justices most deferential to the
legislature in applying section 1. Justice McIntyre, it would seem, was
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more inclined to exercise his self-restraint at the first stage of Charter
cases by giving a narrow interpretation of Charter rights, thereby
avoiding the need to even consider section 1 arguments in fourteen
cases.
TABLE 16
Section 1 Reasonable Limits Defence by Judge

Wilson
Lamer
Dickson
Estey
Beetz
Le Dain
La Forest
L'Heureux-Dub6
McIntyre

Acceptedl
Saved

Rejectedl
Not Saved

Not
Reached

No. of
Casesa

6
8
12
2
6
4
8
5
7

23
17
19
6
12
5
8
4
11

1
0
1
1
7
5
7
2
14

29
24
31
9
24
14
23
10
30

a. The number of cases is sometimes fewer than row total because a justice may have
more than one section 1 ruling in a single decision, e.g., Devine v. A.G. Quebec,
Black v. Law Society of Alberta.
b. When a section 1 defence is rejected because it is not "imposed by law," it is still
counted as "rejected" (rather than "not reached"), e.g., Dickson C.J.C. in R. v.
Simmons.

The striking feature of Table 17 on the exclusion of evidence is
not a polarization at opposite ends of the Court, but the distinctive
records of L'Heureux-Dub6 and McIntyre. While most of the Court has
been slightly more inclined to exclude evidence once a Charterviolation
has been established, these two Justices have favoured admitting it by a
ratio of more than two to one. This pattern further supports the
classification of L'Heureux-Dub6 and McIntyre as exponents of judicial
self-restraint, in this case driven perhaps by a crime control view of
criminal justice.
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TABLE 17
Exclusion of Evidence per Section 24(2) of the Charter(24 Cases)
Evidence
Excluded

Evidence
Admitted

No
Ruling

Total

Wilson

11

9

3

23

Lamer

12

9

4

25

Dickson

9

7

2

18

Estey

2

1

2

5

Beetz

7

5

1

13

Le Dain

4

4

2

10

11

8

1

20

La Forest
L'Heureux-Dub6

3

8

4

15

McIntyre

5

11

4

20

64

62

23

149

Total

The data presented in tables 11 to 17 make it clear that there is
growing disagreement on the Supreme Court over how the Charter
should be interpreted. The number of unanimous decisions decreased
every year, while the number of dissenting opinions rose. Nor was this
division random. The Court divided into two wings and a centre. The
activist wing was led by Justice Wilson and included Justice Lamer and
usually the Chief Justice. This bloc provided the most consistent support
for Charterclaimants, gave broader interpretations to Charterrights, and
frequently dissented together, usually when the majority voted against
the Charter claimant. They were also less likely to accept section 1
defenses and more likely to exclude evidence under section 24(2).
The other wing exemplified the philosophy of judicial selfrestraint and was led by Justice McIntyre. While McIntyre lacked
reliable allies, he managed to attract all members of the Court to join
him in dissent at least once, except for the three members of the activist
wing. After her appointment in 1987, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 frequently voted with Justice McIntyre. Justice La Forest was an occasional
member of this bloc. All of them were much less likely to support
Charterclaims, tended to give narrower interpretations of the Charter,
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were more receptive toward section 1 defenses, and more reluctant to
dismiss illegally obtained evidence. The leader labels apply to Wilson
and McIntyre because they are on the opposite ends of the
activist/restraint spectrum in every table but one. They also led the
Court in the number of dissents and the number of solo dissents, yet
they never dissented together.
In sum, Wilson and McIntyre have developed very different
theories of proper judicial review under the Charter, theories that
consistently lead them to very different results. Lamer and Dickson
seem to share Wilson's activist perspective, but are less consistent in
following it. L'Heureux-Dub6 and to a lesser extent, La Forest, are
sympathetic to McIntryre's vision of judicial self-restraint. The other
Justices have hewn to a more pragmatic, middle ground.
These empirical findings support and confirm Gold's earlier
qualitative study of the Justices' different approaches to Charterinterpretation.10 9 They make it clear that in borderline cases-and thus far,
no cases have involved clear-cut violations of well-established rights-it
is the judge not the Charterthat determines the outcome of the case.
This conclusion should come as no surprise to those familiar with
the American Supreme Court. Particularly since 1937, it too has
fragmented into different voting blocs with even wider discrepancies
between the voting records of the judges. On the Burger Court (19681986), for example, support for civil liberties claims ranged from a high
of 90.6 percent for Justice Douglas to a low of 19.6 percent for Justice
Rehnquist. 110 Canadian and American experiences, however, diverge at
this point. In the u.s., the perception of federal judges as essentially
political actors has given rise to an increasingly partisan competition
over judicial appointments. The "Bork Affair" was only the most recent
and most visible incident in this struggle. 111 Such nakedly partisan
attempts to shape the outcome of the Supreme Court's decisions by
strategic judicial appointments sit poorly with traditional concepts of
109 Gold, supra, note 27 at 508.
110

J.A. Segal & H.J. Spaeth, "Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results
from the Supreme Court Data Base Project" (1989) 73 Judicature 103 at 107.
III For the liberal view of this struggle, see H. Schwartz, Packingthe Courts: The Conservative
Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution(New York: Scribners and Sons, 1988). For the conservative
view, see G.L. McDowell, Curbing the Courts: the Constitution and the Limits of JudicialPower
(Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).
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judicial independence and impartiality. In practice, however, it is
consistent with interest group behaviour in contemporary Western
democracies. As V.0. Key has written: "Where power rests, there
influence will be brought to bear."112 Courts that act politically will
come to be treated politically.
In Canada, however, there has thus far been no evidence that the
federal government has let ideological criteria influence its Supreme
Court appointments.113 Nor has there been much popular interest in
following the American practice of subjecting the views of Supreme
Court justices to public examination before they are appointed.114
Unlike Americans, it would appear that Canadians prefer to remain in a
state of ideological innocence about their judges. This traditional,
legalistic view of judges may be the legacy of the dominant English
influence in Canadian law prior to 1982. Further evidence of differences
within the Court on Charter issues may well transform the public's
perception that the Supreme Court is "above politics."
A recent exception to this is the apparently successful effort by
Canadian feminist organizations to have the Canadian Judicial Centre
sponsor special education seminars for judges on sexual equality and
systemic discrimination. From a political science/judicial process perspective, this is analogous to the efforts of American feminists to prevent
judges like Robert Bork from being appointed, except that this lobbying
occurs after the appointment and is directed at the appointee rather
than the appointers. The common denominator of both tactics is the
perception that judges can and do use their discretion in interpreting
constitutional rights to alter public policy. Since there is no opportunity
to exert influence prior to the appointment, such as the hearings of the
112

V.O. Key, Politics,Parties,and Pressure Groups (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1958) at

154. Key was explaining the lobbying behaviour of interest groups in the American political system.
It was written in 1958 and referred to lobbyists' concentration on Congressional committees and
administrative agencies, but can be used to explain events like the Bork Affair.

113 There is, however, considerable evidence that partisan patronage has been a major factor
in lower court appointments. See P.H. Russell & J. Zeigel, "Federal Judicial Appointments: An
Appraisal of the First Mulroney Government's Appointments and New Judicial Advisory
Committees" (1991) U.T.L.J. 4 at 22.
114 For arguments in favour of public review, see F.L. Morton, "CharterChanged Justices'
Role" in M. Charlton & P. Barker, eds, Cross Currents1. ContemporaryPoliticalIssues (Toronto:
Nelson Canada, 1991) at 241 [hereinafter Cross Currents]. For a rebuttal, see I. Hunter,

"Confirmation Hearings for Judges Would Lower Quality of the Court" in Cross Currents,ibid. at
244.

1992]

StatisticalAnalysis

Senate Judiciary Committee in the United States, Canadian interest
groups are forced to seek access after the appointment. This novel
spectacle of special education seminars for judges provides just such a
forum. Not surprisingly, anti-feminist groups have protested what they
view as a privileged audience with the judges 15 Since presumably other
Canadian interest groups would also welcome the opportunity to present
their points of view to Canadian judges, it will be interesting to see
whether this practice is expanded or eliminated.
At a minimum, the growing perception of "different judges,
different rights" is likely to produce demands that the Supreme Court
cease its current practice of sitting in panels of seven or fewer
Justices-something they did in approximately 75 percent of their first
one hundred Charterdecisions. In these cases, the outcome of a Charter
challenge may be largely determined by the selection of Justices for the
panel that hears the case, rather than the merits of the case.116 The
prospects of a Charterclaimant are much better before a five judge panel
which includes Chief Justice Dickson and Justices Lamer and Wilson,
rather than one which includes Justices McIntyre, L'Heureux-Dub6, and
La Forest. Awareness of this fact will generate increasing pressure to
organize the Court's work so that all nine Justices participate in Charter
cases.
X. CONCLUSIONS
The Charterhas ushered in a new era for the Supreme Court of
Canada. Nineteen eighty-two marks a turning point for the Court equal
in importance to the abolition of appeals to the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in 1949. After only eight years, the Charter now
constitutes one-quarter of the Supreme Court's annual workload. The
Court has made a clean break with the British-style judicial self-restraint
that characterized its interpretation of the 1960 CanadianBill of Rights.
The Court has upheld Charter claimants in 35 percent of its first one
hundred decisions and declared nineteen statutes void for Charter
115 G. Landolt, President of REAL Women: "We're saying, if you've got an argument to
make, line up like everyone else and make your case in court." See G. Heaton & P. Taylor, "Justice
and Gender" (1990) 17:11 Western Report 34 at 35.

116 For a thorough analysis of this point, see Heard, supra, note 3.
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infractions. The comparable figures for the CanadianBill of Rights were
15 percent and one statute, respectively. In all three of these important
respects-composition of docket, success rate, and nullification of
statutes-there is no longer any appreciable difference between the
Supreme Court's Charterwork and the American Supreme Court's work
under the Bill of Rights. These findings lend support to Lipset's
hypothesis that the Charteris "Americanizing" the practice of politics in
117
Canada.
Like its American counterpart, the Supreme Court now routinely
finds itself in the thick of the political process. Seventy-five percent of
the Court's Charterwork has dealt with legal rights and criminal justice.
While most of these decisions have not touched on issues of great public
interest, the exceptions are important, in particular, abortion and
language rights. The impact of the Charteron the provinces has been
qualitatively greater than its effect on federal law making.
Our study confirms a growing dissension within the Court over
Charterinterpretation since 1986 and argues that this accounts for the
decline of successful Charter challenges after 1985. We document the
division on the Court between activists (Wilson and Lamer) and nonactivists (McIntyre and L'Heureux-Dub6) and suggest that such division
was more or less inevitable given the inescapably contentious character
of modem judicial review. Comparative data from American experience
suggests that such division is to be expected and is even likely to
increase.
For the country too, the Charter,which was promoted as an
instrument of national unity, is ironically becoming a source of disunity
with respect to Quebec. The Supreme Court's application of the
Charter,while by no means the sole explanation of this tendency, has
been a contributing factor. Among the provinces, Quebec's legislature
experienced the most serious reversals in the Supreme Court's first one
hundred Chartercases. Likewise, the Quebec Court of Appeal has been
reversed more often than any other provincial court of appeal. With
respect to the Charter, Quebec may already be well on its way to
becoming a distinct society.

117 S.M. Lipset, ContinentalDivide: The Values and Institutions of the United States and
Canada(Toronto: Canadian-American Committee, 1989) at 116.
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APPENDIX I:
RULES FOR COUNTING SUPREME COURT CHARTER CASES
Counting Supreme Court Chartercases is not a simple task. A
number of issues arise both as to what should count as a Supreme Court
decision, and how the result of a decision should be classified. How
these issues are resolved affects the outcome of quantitative research.
We do not think there is one correct way of handling these issues.
Researchers will follow rules best suited to their research objectives.
However, we do think it is important for those presenting quantitative
studies of the Court's work to state the rules they have followed in
selecting and classifying cases. Only in this way will the scholarly
community have an adequate basis for interpreting the results of
different studies. It is in this spirit that we set out below the rules
adopted for this particular study. We have done this in some detail in
the hope that our explanation of the issues and reasons for our particular treatment of these issues will elicit some comment which might
help us and other scholars in future quantitative studies in this field.
1. The source of our data
We have based our study on the first one hundred cases dealing
with constitutionally entrenched rights and freedoms reported in the
Supreme Court Reports since the Supreme Court's first decision on the
Charter in Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker.1 The cases are
listed in Appendix II of this paper.2 It is our understanding that all of
the Court's decisions on the merits are now reported in the Supreme
Court Reports. But decisions on applications for leave to appeal are not
reported. This means that we do not present data on how the Supreme
Court has dealt with applications for leave to appeal in Chartercases.

1 [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.
2 See below at 54.
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2. Cases decided without reasons
On a number of occasions, the Court has decided Charter
appeals without giving reasons. We have counted these cases as Charter
decisions because the upholding or overturning of lower court decisions
can have a national impact on Charterjurisprudence. A recent example
is Reference Re Workers' CompensationAct, 1983 (Nfld.), 3 where the
Court agreed without reasons with the decision of Newfoundland's
Court of Appeal which rejected an equality right challenge to that
province's Workers' CompensationAct. The Court gave national effect to
the Newfoundland Court's decision, thus insulating similar legislation in
other provinces from a Charterchallenge. Note that these cases are not
counted for purposes of studying the voting records of individual justices
in Tables 12 to 17. 4
3. Cases decided at the same time raisingthe same issue
Occasionally the Court will group together one or more appeals
from different jurisdictions which raise essentially the same issue. It
decides one of the appeals with full reasons and then decides the others
simply by applying the reasons given in the first case. An early example
is the trio of Therens,5 Trask,6 and Rahn,7 in which the Court decided
Trask and Rahn simply by applying its reasons in Therens. In a situation
like this, where the Court finds no significant difference in the facts of
the cases and decides them at the same time and for the same reasons,
we have counted the decisions as a single case. For a national court of
appeal, as contrasted with a trial court, what really counts in assessing
the impact of its decisions is the jurisprudential precedents they
establish. In a situation such as the Therens trilogy, only one such

3 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.
4 See above at 39-44.
5

R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613.
6 Trask v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 655.
7Rahn v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 659.
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precedent is established. Note that for purposes of Tables 3 and 4,
8
however, these companion cases are counted separately.
4. Casesdecided on the basis of non-entrenchedrights
We have excluded cases decided solely on the basis of the
CanadianBill of Rights, federal and provincial human rights statutes or
charters, or common law rights. While some of these decisions may be
more important politically than many Chartercases, they fall outside the
scope of this study. However, we have included a case such as Singh v.
Ministry of Employment and Immigration,9 where three Judges based
their decision on the Canadian Bill of Rights and three Judges based
their decision on the Charter. We excluded cases based on statutory or
common law rights because we think the Court's decisions usually have
their greatest significance when they involve the interpretation and
application of constitutional rights and freedoms.
5. Casesdealing with constitutional ights andfreedoms
entrenched outside the Charter
For the same reason that we excluded decisions concerning
rights and freedoms that are not constitutionally entrenched, we
included decisions on rights entrenched in other parts of the
Constitution that were rendered since the Court's first Charter decision.
The main examples are the minority education and language rights
entrenched in sections 93 and 133 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867,10 the
language rights in section 23 of the Manitoba Act, 11 and the rights of
Aboriginal peoples in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.12
Although the Supreme Court has now rendered a decision on section 35

8 See below, Appendix II at 54, cases 9,47,49, 90, 92, and 95.

9 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
10 (U.K-), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
11 S.C. 1870, c. 3.
12 Being Schedule B of the CanadaAct, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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Aboriginal rights in R. v. Sparrow,13 it is not within the first one hundred
Chartercases and therefore beyond the scope of our study. Our one
hundred cases do include several decisions on minority education and
language rights entrenched outside the Charter, for example, the
Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the EducationAct (Ont.)14 and the
Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights.15 Including these cases does
mean that our study covers a little more than pure Chartercases, but it
seems artificial to exclude these cases when the jurisprudential issues
they raise and their constitutional significance are so akin to those
16
involved in Chartercases. A borderline case for us was R. v. Mercure,
in which the Court, in effect, decided that French language rights in
Saskatchewan (and by implication, Alberta) were based on statutory
rather than constitutional rights. In the end, we decided to include this
case because it made an important ruling on the extent of entrenched
language rights.
6. Cases in which the Charterwas argued but the decision was based on
non-Chartergrounds
In a number of cases, where one of the parties advanced a
Charterclaim, the Court decided the case on other grounds. An example
is Westendorp v. R., 1 7 in which the Court decided the case on division of
powers grounds and did not deal with the Charter. While these cases do
show the Court's reluctance to deal with Charterclaims unnecessarily, we
have excluded them as they do not establish jurisprudential precedents
on constitutional rights.

13 [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
14 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
15 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 347.
16 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234.
17 [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43.
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7. Cases involving non-substantiverulings on the Charter
We have included cases decided on the basis of procedural or
18
jurisdictional issues concerning the Charter. Examples are R. v. James,
where the Court decided the Charterdid not have retrospective effect,
and Borowski v. A.G. Canada,19 in which the Court ruled that a Charter
claim was not justiciable. The decisions in these cases have an important
effect on the scope of the Charter'sapplicability.
8. Wins and losses
In classifying a Chartercase as a "win" or a "loss" we considered
only the effect of the Court's decision on the Charterclaimant's petition.
That is, did the Charter claimant get what he or she wanted from the
Court? A case in which the Court found that a law violated a Charter
right, but then upheld the law on the grounds that it constituted a
"reasonable limit" under section 1 is counted as a loss. Similarly, we
counted a case as a loss if the Court found that the police violated an
accused person's Charterrights, but nevertheless, under section 24(2),
refused to exclude evidence resulting from the Charterviolation. A case
in which the Charterclaimant failed with one or more Charter claims but
won at least one other Charterclaim, is still counted as a win if he or she
received the desired result on the basis of the one successful Charter
claim. A case is put in the "inconclusive" category only when the actual
results (not simply doctrinal holdings) are a mixture of success and
failure for the Charterclaimant. Examples of cases with such outcomes
are Krug v. R.,20 andDevine v. A.G. Quebec.21 In these cases, the Court
found some sections of the impugned legislation unconstitutional, but
upheld other parts of the legislation as valid.

18 [1988] 1 S.C.R. 669.
19 [1989] 1 S.CR. 342.
20 [193512 S.C.R. 255.
21 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 NO.

I

APPENDIX II:
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA'S FIRST ONE HUNDRED
CHARTER DECISIONS*

1. Law Society of Upper Canadav. Skapinker, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357.
2. A.G. Quebec v. QuebecAssociationof ProtestantSchool Boards, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66.
3. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.
4. A.G. Quebec v. GreaterHull School Board, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 575.
5. Singh v. Minister ofEmployment andImmigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
6. R. v. Big MDrugMart Ltd, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
7. Staranchukv. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 439.
8. OperationDismantleInc. v.R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
9. R. v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613; Trask v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 655; and Rahn v. R.,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 659.
10. Reference Re ManitobaLanguage Rights, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 347.
11. Kng v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 255.
12. Spencer v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278.
13. Dubois v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350.
14. Reference Re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
15. Valente v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673.
16. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
17. Clarkson v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383.
18. Bilodeau v.A.G. Manitoba, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 449.
19. MacDonald v. Montreal (City of), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460.
20. Sociit6 des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. Association of Parents, [1986] 1
S.C.R. 549.
21. Mills v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863.
22. Carterv.R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 981.
23. R. v. Mannion, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 272.
24. Jones v. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.
25. R.W.D.S.U.v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
26. R. v. Edwards Books andArtLtd, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
27. A.G. Manitoba v. MetropolitanStores Ltd, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110.
28. Collins v. ., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265.
* Including language and education rights cases based on sections 93 and 133
of the
ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3; section 23 of the ManitobaAct, S.C. 1870, c. 3; and
section 16 of the SaskatchewanAct, S.C. 1905, c. 42.
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29. R. v. Hamill, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 301 and R. v. Sieben, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 295.
30. Reference Re Public Service Employees RelationsAct (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313.

31. P.SA.C. v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424.
32. R.W.D.S.U. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
33. Canadav. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500.
34. Argentinav. Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536.
35. U.S.A. v.Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564.

36. R. v. Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588.
37. R. v. Pohoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945.
38. R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
39. Reference Re Bill 30, An Act to Amend the EducationAct (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

R. v. Manninen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1233.
R. v. Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 309.
R. v.Albright, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 383.
R. v. Tremblay, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 435.
R. v. Dawson, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 461.
R. v. Milne, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 512.
R. v. Baig, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 537.

47. R. v. Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541; Trumbley and Pugh v. Metropolitan Toronto
Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 577; and Trimm v. Durham RegionalPolice, [1987] 2 S.C.R.

582.
48. Burnham v. Metropolitan Toronto Police, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 572.

49. R. v. Vaillancourt,[1987] 2 S.C.R. 636 and R. v. Laviolette, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 667.
50. R. v. Morgentaler,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
51. R. v. Mercure, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 234.

52. R. v. Hufsky, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 621.
53. R. v. Thomsen, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 640.
54. R. v. Dairy Supplies Ltd, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 665.

55. R. v. James, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 669.
56. R. v. Corbett, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 670.

57. R. v. Holmes, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 914.
58. R. v. Vermette, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 985.
59. CorporationProfessionelle des Midecins du Quibec v. Thibault, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1033.

60. R. v. Upston, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1083.
61. R. v. Stevens, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1153.
62. R. v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3.
63. CanadianNewspapers Co. v. A.G. Canada,[1988] 2 S.C.R. 122.

64. B.C.G.E.U. v.A.G. British Columbia, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214.
65. R. v. Beare; R. v. Higgins, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387.
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67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417.
R. v. Schwartz, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 443.
R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495.
R. v.Jacoy, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 548.
R. v. Gamble, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 595.
Fordv.A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
Devine v.A.G. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 790.
R. v. Bernard,[1988] 2 S.C.R. 833.
R. v. Strachan, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 980.
R. v. Ross, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 3.
R. v.Amway Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 21.
R. v. Genest, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 59.
R. v. Duguay, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 93.
Andrews v. Law Society ofBritish Columbia, [1989] 1.S.C.R. 143.
80. Borowski v.A.G. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 342.
81. GreaterMontrealProtestantSchool Boardv.A.G. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 377.
82. R. v. Potvin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 525.
83. Black v. Law Society ofAlberta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 591.
84. Reference Re Workers' CompensationAct, 1983 (Nfld.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922.
85. Irwin Toy Ltd v.A.G. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927.
86. R. v. Lamb, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1036.
87. Slaight CommunicationsInc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038.
88. R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
89. R. v. Lambretta, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1391.
90. U.S.A. v. Cotroni; U.S.A. v. El Zein, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
91. R. v. Leduc, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1586.
92. Dupont v. Watier, [1989] 1. S.C.R. 1588 and R. v. Lavigne, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1588.
93. R. v. Kalanj, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594.
94. R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1658.
95. R. v. Meltzer, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1764; R. v. Heikel, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1776; and
R. v. Oullette, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1781.
96. R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138.
97. MacKay v. Manitoba, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357.
98. R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368.
99. Tremblay v.Daigk, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 530.
100. R. v. Szlovak, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1114.

